The Reality of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from a Numerical Perspective —Promote BRI for the Purpose of Increasing “pro-China” Countries—

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the following three objectives: 1) to counter the TPP, 2) to stimulate overseas demand, and 3) to promote the development of inland China. In 2017, the need to counter the TPP diminished when the United States announced its intention to withdraw from the TPP negotiations, but the United States’ hardline policy toward China and the inclination toward an “America First” policy have increased the need for China to ensure that more countries will take a “pro-China” political position. As a result, the Xi Jinping administration sought to expand trade, investment, and aid through the BRI in order to increase the number of “pro-China” countries.

More than 100 countries, mainly developing countries, have given assent to the BRI and signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on BRI cooperation. In Japan, the BRI is called a “broad-area economic zone initiative” because of the large number of signatories and the geographical reach of the BRI. However, it is not clear whether the MOUs serve as a foothold for a broad-area economic zone because they are bilateral agreements with China and the contents of the agreements have not been disclosed. To determine whether the BRI is moving toward the development of a broad-area economic zone, it is necessary to analyze in detail the relationships between the countries that have signed an MOU and China.

Therefore, this paper quantifies the economic and political relationships with China of the 138 countries that signed an MOU, using indicators that represent the strength of their ties with China, and thereby measures the closeness of their relationships with China. As a result of the analysis, it is confirmed that 37 Asian countries have generally close relationships with China. On the other hand, in Europe, Oceania, and Latin America, there are many countries with weak economic and/or political ties with China. Given the large variability in their relationships with China among the 138 countries, it is premature at this point to regard the BRI as a broad-area economic zone initiative.

Looking at major countries, Cambodia has been increasing its economic dependence on China, signing a bilateral FTA in October 2020. As a result, Cambodia has the strongest economic and political ties with China among the 138 countries. Russia, on the other hand, is politically close with China, but not economically.

As U.S. President-elect Joe Biden is unlikely to soften America’s hardline stance toward China, it seems that breaking the potential encirclement of China will become an urgent and most important objective of the BRI. In fact, China has already secured “pro-China” countries in Africa and elsewhere, so it will not be isolated in the United Nations. Securing “pro-China” countries among the G20 members will be a challenge in the future. The members of the G20 include seven signatories of MOUs on BRI cooperation. It is believed that China will build up a track record of cooperation in such areas as fostering excellent IT engineers and promoting non-oil-dependent industries, and strengthen relationship with countries with weak economic ties.

In addition, under the policy of “emphasis on quality,” the BRI will promote cooperation in a wide range of fields such as the digital industry and public health, as well as the conclusion of high-level bilateral and multilateral FTAs, and it is expected that the current cooperative relationships centering on infrastructure development will be raised to a higher level. However, the expansion of the trade deficits of relevant countries with China and the low public support for overseas assistance in China may hinder the progress of the BRI.

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