JRI Research Journal;Vol.9 No.9,
The Rise of Shareholder Activism in Japan and Implications for Japanese Listed Companies
Tsuyoshi Yoshida
The number of activist interventions in Japanese listed companies has been on the rise in recent years. This trend is driven by relatively low valuations of Japanese firms compared to their Western peers, alongside ongoing corporate governance reforms spearheaded by the Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).
Targeted companies typically exhibit certain financial and structural traits, such as low Price-to- Book Ratios (PBR), low leverage (debt-to-equity), and high cash-to-asset ratios. Furthermore, a lower percentage of shareholdings by financial institutions and a higher concentration of foreign institutional investors are often observed as indicators.
Activist proposals are evolving significantly in both quantity and quality. Beyond traditional demands for enhanced shareholder returns or the appointment and dismissal of directors, there is a growing trend toward sophisticated proposals targeting firms’ core business strategies. These include fundamental overhauls of business portfolios, M&A activity, and take-private transactions.
There is an increasing prevalence of "bumpitrage," where activists intervene after the announcement of a Tender Offer (TOB) to demand an increase in the purchase price. This is particularly notable in privatization deals such as Management Buyouts (MBOs), the elimination of parent-subsidiary listings, and making equity-method affiliates wholly-owned subsidiaries.
As activist activity intensifies, the following three pillars are essential for Japanese listed companies and regulatory bodies: